



Understanding the Link between **CENTER OF GRAVITY** and **MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT**

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DURING THE PAST DECADE there has been a proliferation of literature on effective methodologies to identify and neutralize, weaken, or destroy a center of gravity (COG).¹ This trend continues with the rewrites of Joint Publications (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.² However, despite these impressive doctrinal developments, understanding and applying the COG concept remains problematic. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), several retired general officers provided military analyses and commentary for the news networks. Unfortunately, there was little agreement in their views. They described the Iraqi COG as being comprised of Saddam Hussein, Baghdad, intelligence, and Republican Guard forces, among others.

Identifying the COG

What makes identifying a COG so difficult? A partial answer lies in the relationship between the COG and mission accomplishment. Joint Publication 3-0 links the COG and victory: “In theory, direct attacks against enemy COGs resulting in their destruction or neutralization is the most direct path to victory.”³ A similar statement appears in JP 5-0: “The essence of operational art lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, weaken, defeat, or destroy it. In theory, this is the most direct path to mission accomplishment.”⁴

The only difference between the two statements is the change from “victory” to “mission accomplishment.” However, although the statements clearly codify the relationship between neutralizing a COG and accomplishing the mission, they do not explain what that relationship is. Without an explanation, doctrine creates unreasonable expectations, if not confusion. The relationship between the COG and mission accomplishment is complex, and understanding it is a critical step in the joint operation planning process. Thus, while evolving U.S. joint doctrine seems headed in the right direction, it still fails to provide the necessary explicit details needed to understand this relationship.

This article examines the link between mission accomplishment at the operational level of war and neutralizing, weakening, or destroying a COG.⁵ It does this by exploring four linked propositions:

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PHOTO: The toppled statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square, downtown Baghdad, 9 April 2003. (AP)

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- Mission accomplishment at the operational level is the Department of Defense's contribution to a strategic end state in war. Specifically, mission accomplishment is achieved when a military force imposes its will on an adversary.

- Mission accomplishment can be achieved either by forcing an adversary to change his intentions or by eliminating an adversary's ability to resist imposition of will. By joint doctrine, the preferred method is to force a rapid change of intentions.

- Neutralization or destruction of an adversary capability may have no behavioral effect on an adversary leader (no change of intentions).

- An adversary decides to change intentions as a result of situational awareness. However, joint doctrine does not adequately acknowledge this cause-and-effect relationship; in fact, it advocates neutralization of the means by which an adversary obtains situational awareness.

Mission Accomplishment

Since the COG and mission accomplishment are linked in joint doctrine, it is important to agree on what mission accomplishment is for an operational-level commander. Although JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, does not define mission accomplishment, the National Military Strategy addresses it under "The Mission of the Armed Forces."⁶ One of the specified missions of the Armed Forces is to "prevail against adversaries." Clausewitz, on page one of Book One in *On War*, provides insight on what prevailing against adversaries entails: "War is . . . an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."⁷ But how does a force impose its will?

According to JP 2.0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, "Combatant and subordinate joint force commanders and their component commanders focus on military capabilities and intentions of adversaries and potential adversaries."⁸ This suggests that we should attempt to impose our will on an adversary by attacking or otherwise seeking to affect his capabilities and intentions.

Clausewitz seems to anticipate at least part of 2.0's claim and its implications. He observed that to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors. The first factor is the total means at his disposal—in other

words, his capabilities. Clausewitz's second factor, however, is not the adversary's intentions, but his strength of will. The extent of an adversary's means is a matter mainly of figures and should be measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged approximately, by the strength of the motive animating it.⁹

If we listen to Clausewitz, one way to impose one's will on an adversary is to neutralize or destroy his capability to resist. When an adversary's capability is rendered ineffective and resistance is no longer possible, what the adversary leader wants to do militarily does not matter—he has no options. This approach is known as attrition warfare.¹⁰ In theory, the attrition approach seems reasonable. In practice, though, it is quite difficult (if not impossible) and time-consuming, and it requires substantial resources to render a determined foe completely defenseless. Also, residual military capability might re-form as a guerrilla force and employ irregular warfare to continue a conflict.

According to joint doctrine and emerging concepts, attrition warfare is not how the U.S. envisions fighting future wars. As JP 3-0 explains, when national leaders decide to conduct a major operation or campaign to achieve national strategic objectives, "the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the [host nation] and the United States and its multinational partners."¹¹ It follows that the preferred method for imposing coalition will is to seek a rapid change in intentions.

Two examples of an adversary possessing the means to resist but electing to accept imposition of will are Japan and Iraq. While Japan still had a sizeable force capable of defending the homeland in 1945, the country's leaders surrendered to the Allies following the dropping of two atomic bombs and Russia's declaration of war.¹² Operation Desert Storm is a more recent example of forcing an adversary leader to change his intentions. Although Saddam Hussein still had the capability to resist coalition forces, the campaign was clearly not going his way after a substantial conventional force was brought to bear against him. Consequently, he submitted to the will of the coalition before his Republican Guard was destroyed or before the coalition could initiate new objectives, such as an attack toward Baghdad.

While a coalition might be able to impose its will on an adversary, doing so will not, by itself, normally be sufficient to achieve a strategic end state. However, successful imposition of will, in concert with the effects of other elements of national power, can establish an environment that might help attain the desired strategic end state.

Changing Intentions

Ultimately, according to joint doctrine, a U.S. backed coalition will seek to force a change of intentions that translates into an adversary leader's decision to capitulate. Much of that coercion will require the infliction of pain, as Martin Cook makes clear in his book *Moral Warrior*, when he observes that operational planners seek to determine "how much pain to the enemy the destruction of the target is likely to cause and how much pain the enemy leadership is willing to absorb before it will capitulate."¹³

There is a large body of literature on decision theory, and joint doctrine incorporates much of it as part of the joint operation planning process. To figure out where and how best to apply pain to force capitulation, an operational planner must think along with the adversary leader and attempt to understand what that leader is thinking and feeling. The knowledge that all strategic decision makers go through a four-step process of framing, gathering intelligence, coming to conclusions, and learning from feedback can assist the operational planner in gaining insight into the adversary leader's mindset.¹⁴

Framing. For a coalition planner, understanding the adversary leader's framing process is critical to linking the COG to mission accomplishment. Framing is "defining what must be decided and determining in a preliminary way what criteria would cause you to prefer one option over another."¹⁵ In effect, framing means the adversary leader assesses the situation and determines where his pain threshold is: Will extensive loss of life or damage to his country's infrastructure be reason to capitulate? Will he cease hostilities to retain power or some level of military capability? Will he retreat or surrender to save face? If an operational planner can gain a proper understanding of the adversary leader's frame, the coalition will be less likely to waste time, effort, and resources trying to neutralize capabilities that are not critically important to the adversary.

The 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo is an example of a coalition force misreading an adversary's frame. NATO forces began with a limited attack focused on Serb military and security forces "to force [Serb President Slobodan] Milosevic to comply with the directions given by the international community."¹⁶ After the conflict, U.S. General Wesley K. Clark realized that a variety of factors (among them loss of outside support), and not just military losses, eventually caused Milosevic to surrender.¹⁷ According to a RAND Corporation study, "the evidence suggests that Milosevic consistently viewed his options with regard to the Kosovo conflict solely through a lens of self-interest."¹⁸ Two points are worth noting: NATO did not fully understand what was important to Milosevic when it began the campaign by attacking his military and security units; and even after the war, analysts could not identify one specific condition or event that led Milosevic to capitulate.

Understanding how the adversary leader will frame his decision criteria might depend on whether the coalition campaign's objective is to restore a preexisting situation (removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait, for example) or change a regime.¹⁹ In the first situation, the adversary leader might believe that accepting a return to prewar conditions is a better option than the alternatives, which could include destruction of



A Marine sits atop his AAV-7 in Gnjilane, Kosovo, 1 July 1999. Marines and Sailors of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed to Kosovo as part of Joint Guardian, an operation to provide peace and stability to the war-torn country.

DOD

his forces or his country's infrastructure, or direct personal attack. The adversary leader's frame might drive his decision to abandon his aims—to change his intentions—fairly quickly.

In a situation where a coalition's objective is regime change and the adversary leader's primary criterion is the retention of power, the leader's only realistic option is to continue to resist with all means available. In either type of campaign—one with limited objectives or one seeking regime change—operational planners must acknowledge that the criteria that could compel an adversary leader to capitulate might not be fixed; instead, they could be contextual and extensively based on coalition objectives.

Saddam faced both types of coalition operations. In 1991, he abandoned his goal of annexing Kuwait because coalition forces achieved their limited objectives, which included removing his occupying forces from Kuwait and destroying many of the units that enabled him to move against Kuwait. In 2003, facing a coalition seeking regime change, he was unwilling to surrender knowing the result would be total loss of power. In spite of the coalition forces' overwhelming success on the battlefield, Saddam's intentions remained unaltered. He did not order his government, military, or citizens to submit to coalition authority; in fact, he did the opposite.

Gathering intelligence. The adversary leader's decision making is predicated to no small degree on the intelligence he is given. Analysts and planners must keep in mind that the information an adversary leader gets comes from intelligence subject to distortion and misinterpretation. Even if coalition forces understand the mental frame the adversary leader will use to make decisions, they cannot ensure that he will actually get the information he needs to understand what has happened and is happening in the operational environment. In fact, the adversary leader's capitulation criteria could be met without him even knowing it.

Coming to conclusions. Even if the adversary leader frames the problem properly and gathers all of the relevant intelligence, his decision might still not be a good one, or an expected one.²⁰

Learning from feedback. The adversary leader faces an uncooperative environment in which it may be difficult to apply any lessons learned.²¹ Once conflict begins, he might not get another chance to learn from or make decisions of similar magnitude,

especially if the coalition objective is regime change. The operational planner must take this into account when assessing the adversary leader's mindset.

In summary, decision theory tells us that planners who recommend an adversary COG should base the recommendation on an understanding of the adversary leader's frame, what he knows (or will know when the presumed COG is neutralized), how he makes decisions, and what he has learned from past decisions. Unfortunately, in practice many of these factors are neither known nor determinable.

Understanding Adversary Leaders

Joint Publication 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*, states that as the joint force determines the significant characteristics of the operational area, one of the factors to consider is the "psychological characteristics of adversary decision making." According to the JP, understanding the leader is important in helping predict how that leader might respond in a given situation.²² One problem with this doctrine is that it presumes strategic leaders are predictable.

Carl A. Barksdale, a former student at the Naval War College, analyzed three wars in an effort to determine if there were any patterns in the strategic decision-making process that would prompt national leaders to ultimately abandon their quest for strategic objectives in conflict.²³ He analyzed U.S. decisions following the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989, and Israel's decision to withdraw from Lebanon in May 2000.

Barksdale's conclusion? It is still not clear how leaders of those countries made their decisions. He believes that the salience of decisional inputs to a leader cannot be determined. In short, he found little evidence to show that a better understanding of the history and cultures of the countries would help outside observers predict such decisions. Moreover, Barksdale doubts any future system will be able to predict decisions effectively. Nonetheless, current and emerging doctrine advocates a better understanding of adversary culture.²⁴

Through war gaming, a coalition might be able to predict the physical, functional, and possibly systemic effects of its planned actions against COGs.²⁵

Predicting a specific behavioral effect on a leader, however, might not be possible. The adversary leader might have little or no idea as to what factors will actually drive his decisions, especially those leading to defeat. If so, where does this leave planners as a major operation unfolds? Following neutralization or destruction of a presumed COG, four outcomes appear possible:

- *Abdication or death of the adversary leader.*

This outcome includes the special situation where the adversary leader is viewed as a COG. The adversary leader flees or is killed, and adversarial forces are no longer under central control. Regardless of what happens to the leader, his absence or demise will create an extremely complex situation for the coalition. If no new leader emerges, imposing the coalition's will will require changing the intentions of multiple (and potentially heretofore unknown) subleaders throughout the government or military; continuing the effort to eliminate adversarial capability; or a combination of both. Moreover, there might be little or no intelligence on how emerging or potential leaders will or could operate and make decisions. A recent example of the latter situation occurred during OIF, when Major General James Mattis expressed concern about the lack of information available on the Iraqi commanders he faced in the early stages of the conflict.²⁶

- *Negotiation of a settlement short of surrender.*

The adversary leader abandons his strategic goals to halt coalition military action, which could lead to some type of compromise.

- *Capitulation.* The adversary leader recognizes the futility of pursuing his objectives and surrenders.

- *No apparent change in adversary intentions.*

The adversary leader either does not understand what happened or still believes he can achieve his strategic objectives in spite of the loss of capability. The conflict will continue, with coalition forces neutralizing or destroying subsequent COGs until the adversary leader reaches his psychological threshold of pain (if one exists) or until his capability to resist is completely eliminated. In effect, the coalition will shift its aim from forcing a change of intentions to prosecuting attrition warfare as a way to impose its will. It is important to note that the adversary leader's decision will determine such a change in the nature of the conflict. If he continues to resist regardless of

the effectiveness of coalition efforts, the coalition must either continue fighting in hopes of eventually forcing a change of intentions (with the possibility of never achieving that goal) or modify its objectives.

In summary, neutralizing, weakening, or destroying successive COGs might lead to mission accomplishment at the operational level of war if the adversary leader capitulates. If he doesn't, the coalition must be prepared to continue to erode his capability through attrition, rendering the adversary defenseless and leading to imposition of its will. The latter option, however, is not how the United States either envisions or wants to fight future wars.

The Importance of Situational Awareness

To be able to make informed decisions about the status of his warfighting capacity, the adversary leader must have situational awareness of the effect of coalition operations. If he does not, his COG could be neutralized but, unaware of his predicament, he will continue to fight. The adversary leader's situational awareness is certainly no given: the great extent of the modern operational environment will preclude his observation of most if not all of the events occurring within it; and the information conduit leading from an effect to the adversary leader is relatively fragile and can be easily disrupted. If the coalition seeks a change of intentions based on effects against COGs, it must ensure that the adversary leader retains an information conduit that enables situational awareness.

An example of strategic lack of awareness was evident in OIF when Mohammed Said al-Sahaf ("Baghdad Bob"), the Iraqi Minister of Information, declared at a press conference that coalition forces were nowhere near Baghdad. Even as he spoke, coalition forces were actively securing key positions throughout the city. Many viewers dismissed his claim as a laughable attempt at propaganda; in fact, he and other Iraqi military leaders had no idea how successful the coalition had been.²⁷

Emerging doctrine recognizes the need to understand how the adversary uses his links and nodes. Joint Publication 3-0 refers to both the positive and negative effects of degrading the adversary's command and control (C2) system, and JP 3-13, *Information Operations*, mentions the enemy feedback mechanism for gaining situational awareness.²⁸



AP Photo/SKY

Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf, nicknamed “Baghdad Bob” by coalition troops, tells reporters that there are no enemy soldiers in the capital just hours before the city fell, 7 April 2003.

However, there is no mention of the importance of ensuring that an adversary leader retains at least enough situational awareness to tell him of the effects of coalition operations against presumed COGs.

There are several other considerations operational planners must take into account when considering an adversary’s situational awareness. For one, there might be a delay between an action and the adversary leader’s (or any leader’s) understanding of the overall effects of the action. The Tet Offensive was a series of tactical disasters for the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, but uncorrected press reports of quite visible tactical actions “convinced most Americans that the war could not be won in an acceptable time and at an acceptable cost.”²⁹ Over the long term, the result was an information victory for the North that did much to end U.S. participation in the war.

Another factor to consider regarding situational awareness is that an observed effect must often be delivered to the adversary leader, normally through communications links and nodes.³⁰ Unless there is a direct line to the leader, the information will pass through successive headquarters where it might be subjected to intentional suppression, misinterpretation, or omissions caused by staff procedures, human errors, or technical distortions and problems. During the major combat phase of OIF, bad news on the battlefield from the Iraqi perspective was either suppressed or softened in successive Iraqi headquarters.³¹

In addition to the degradation inherent in the adversary’s information-handling procedures, U.S. joint doctrine advocates military operations that break the adversary’s information conduit. Joint Publication 5-0 proposes isolating the adversary force from its command and control as an indirect means to get at a COG.³² Additionally, in a vignette on future warfare, the Joint Functional Concept for Force Application implies that disrupting and blinding enemy C2 is desirable.³³ Coalition targeting resulting in electronic and physical isolation of adversary units and C2 nodes could break the information conduit at the tactical and operational levels. Coalition forces could neutralize a presumed COG to drive an adversary decision, but could simultaneously interfere with the flow of intelligence that a decision maker needs to support the decision sought.

Situational awareness at the adversary leader’s location might also be a problem. Someone must receive the message, understand it, and be willing to deliver the bad news to the appropriate authority. Unfortunately, not all leaders accept bad news well. In fact, U.S. Army leadership doctrine recognizes that leaders occasionally shoot the messenger.³⁴ Saddam did not welcome bad news. When asked by the Iraq Survey Group after OIF-I how Saddam treated people who brought him bad news, Ali Hasan Al Majid (“Chemical ‘Ali’”), who was part of Saddam’s inner circle, said he did not know. The implication is that people did not bring bad news to Saddam.³⁵

Another potential break in the information conduit can occur when the leader deliberately restricts the flow of information. During the Vietnam War, President Lyndon B. Johnson “blocked the avenues by which he might obtain the [Joint] Chiefs’ advice...” and never received the results of a Pentagon war game that indicated flaws in his strategy.³⁶

Leader intransigence is yet another reason why an adversary might not capitulate. When presented with bad news, the adversary leader must acknowledge the effect of the event. Some simply do not. Hitler refused to recognize the precarious state of General Friedrich Paulus’s 6th Army at Stalingrad. Despite messages describing deplorable conditions and 6th Army’s low prospects for survival, Hitler ordered Paulus to hold on. Hitler was unwilling to accept the reality that an airlift could not adequately supply



LBJ Library, Yoichi R. Okamoto

President Lyndon B. Johnson takes a break from work in the Oval Office, January 1966. Historians have criticized Johnson for trying to micromanage the Vietnam War from his office in Washington.

Paulus's force. The loss of 6th Army cost Germany over 100,000 men.³⁷

While an adversary leader must have situational awareness to make a decision favorable to the coalition, the assumption that there *is* an adversary leader to make the decision might not be valid. This problem is created when the adversary leader is believed to be the COG. U.S. President George W. Bush decided to initiate the running start in OIF with a “decapitation strike . . . intending to kill Saddam Hussein and the senior regime leadership in one fell swoop.”³⁸ But if the strike had been successful, who would have told Iraq's armies and its people to stand down? With whom would Bush's commanders have negotiated an end to the fighting? In some cases, a direct attack on the adversary leader might not get the coalition closer to mission accomplishment. In fact, it might create problems, such as there being no strategic decision makers or conversely, multiple, potentially unknown, decision makers.³⁹

The Importance of a Clear Information Conduit

Once the adversary leader decides to capitulate, his decision must be passed to his people and military. This, too, is not a given, as continued Japanese resistance in the Philippines long after the end of World War II attests. Additionally, the leader's commanders must accept his decision and submit to coalition will. If enemy forces no longer recognize the leader's authority and ignore his orders, COG neutralization will not lead to immediate change of intention.

Perhaps the best example of a national leader who lost authority is Napoleon III during the Franco-Prussian War. After attempting to rescue Marshal Achille Bazaine's forces at Metz, he was captured at the battle of Sedan in September 1870. When news of his capture and subsequent capitulation reached Paris, the city responded with a bloodless revolution and recognized new leadership under General Louis Jules Trochu, Léon Gambetta, and Jules Favre. Napoleon III's authority as the recognized leader was effectively negated, and the war continued until the armistice in February 1871.⁴⁰

While essential to conveying coalition effects to a leader, an intact conduit of information can be a double-edged sword. If it functions effectively, it allows the adversary to control his forces and resources. Thus, a risk assessment is required to consider the adversary leader's need for situational awareness, the desired strategic end state, and the potential for adversary tactical or operational successes resulting from accurate situational awareness. The fact remains, though, that an adversary leader who does not understand the precarious situation his country and military are in has no reason to capitulate. U.S. joint doctrine must acknowledge the need to leave the adversary an operational conduit of information, one that stretches from effect to adversary leader to the leader's forces and people.

Interestingly, aspects of joint doctrine acknowledge the importance of the decision maker, the information conduit to him, and the decision process. Joint doctrine on military deception implicitly recognizes the need to leave an adversary leader some means of situational awareness: “The deception must target the adversary decision maker capable of taking the desired action(s). The adversary's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance system is normally not the target; rather,



Otto von Bismarck and Napoleon III after the Battle of Sedan.

it [the deception target] is the primary conduit used in MILDEC [military deception] to convey selected information to the decision maker."⁴¹ Joint doctrine also describes reasons why deceptions fail, including the target's failure to receive the story.⁴² Unfortunately, current joint doctrine directly associated with the COG and mission accomplishment is not as clear on this subject as we might wish.

Points for Review

The COG concept has been in the joint community for 15 years and has survived 4 major operations and multiple small-scale contingencies. The process associated with selecting a COG has proven to be extremely useful in focusing limited resources on key capabilities to drive a change of intentions by an adversary leader. Overall, the concept appears valid.

To accomplish its mission at the operational level of war, a coalition must impose its will on an adversary. Joint doctrine states that the preferred outcome of such an imposition is a rapid change in adversary intentions. Thus, using a construct similar to that used in deception operations, a coalition should focus its efforts on influencing the adversary leader and his decisions.

Neutralizing what are believed to be COGs might not lead an adversary leader to change his intentions. If the leader never capitulates and the coalition continues to neutralize adversary capabilities, intentions ultimately do not matter. Once the capability to resist

is eliminated, the adversary leader will either submit to coalition will, be killed, or flee. In any case, the coalition will be in a position to dictate terms to the nation and its emerging leaders. If adversary intentions do not change, the coalition must continue to neutralize or destroy adversary capability in order to impose its (the coalition's) will.

Identifying and neutralizing a COG is a step toward mission accomplishment. However, operational planners must also understand the adversary leader's mind and world view. They must ensure he has situational awareness of coalition effects and possesses the ability to communicate his decisions to fielded forces. Failure to ensure that the adversary leader can understand the physical, functional, and

systemic effects the coalition achieves might needlessly prolong the conflict.

Clausewitz maintains that "everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult."⁴³ Commanders and operational planners should not be disappointed or believe doctrine has failed them if neutralizing what is believed to be a COG does not lead directly to mission accomplishment; for while the concept appears to be simple, the link between neutralizing the COG and accomplishing the mission is neither well understood nor well documented.

Clausewitz made clear the link between neutralizing a COG and victory, and U.S. joint doctrine has adopted Clausewitz's COG concept.⁴⁴ The emerging joint doctrine on operations and planning must take the next step: it must clarify the link between neutralizing the COG and accomplishing the mission. **MR**

NOTES

1. Clausewitz defined the center of gravity (COG) as the "hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends" (*On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret [New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976], 595-96). The current approved joint definition is "those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight" (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* [Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), as amended through 8 August 2006]. The evolving joint definition is "A source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act" (JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* [Washington, DC: GPO, 26 December 2006], GL-6).


2. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006); JP 5-0.

3. JP 3-0, IV-12.

4. JP 5-0, IV-9.

5. JP 1-02 defines operational art as "the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces" (389).

6. Richard B. Myers, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: JCS, 2004), 2.
7. Clausewitz, 75.
8. JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000), III-2. A similar statement appears in the July 2006 draft of JP 2-0.
9. Clausewitz, 77.
10. JP 1-02 defines attrition as "the reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and materiel," 52.
11. JP 3-0, I-14.
12. Barton J. Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little-Known Near-Disasters, and Modern Memory," in *Hiroshima in History and Memory*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 72. The decision to capitulate was not a popular one with Japanese military leaders even after the second bomb. However, the emperor prevailed by agreeing to guarantee that the imperial system would be retained.
13. Martin L. Cook, *The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 86.
14. J. Edward Russo and Paul J.H. Schoemaker, *Decision Traps* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 2. Russo and Schoemaker's idea is simply another way of looking at the input-process-output and feedback models common in strategic decision-making literature.
15. Ibid.
16. Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), 222.
17. Ibid., 405-406.
18. Stephen T. Hosmer, *The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2001), 2.
19. Myers, 12-13. Terms recently used to describe these situations are "swiftly defeat adversaries" and "win decisively." Some operation plans will focus on achieving a limited set of objectives. Commanders' plans to swiftly defeat adversaries will include options to alter the unacceptable behavior or policies of states, rapidly seize the initiative or prevent conflict escalation, deny an adversary sanctuary, defeat his offensive capabilities or objectives, and provide support to post-conflict stability. A campaign to win decisively will include actions to destroy an adversary's military capabilities through the integrated application of air, ground, maritime, space, and information capabilities and, potentially, remove adversary regimes when directed.
20. Russo and Schoemaker, 119.
21. Ibid., 208.
22. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000), II-5. Under "The Leadership," JP 2-01.3 states that "biographical background data on key adversary military and political leaders, both ruling and opposition, should be compiled. This data should include information regarding the leader's ethnic, class, and family background; education, experience, and training; and core beliefs and values. Character trait data such as a leader's core beliefs and values, perceptual biases, and decision-making style should be combined with a historical track record of that leader's past decisions. Such information may be used to construct a psychological profile for the leader that might assist in predicting how that leader may respond in a given situation. Depending on the amount of data available, it may be possible to construct a psychological profile for the leadership as a whole, as well as for specific individuals" (II-38 through II-39).
23. Carl A. Barksdale, *The Network Centric Operations—Effects Based Operations Marriage: Can it Enable Prediction of "Higher Order" Effects on the Will of the Adversary* (Newport, RI: The Naval War College, 2002), 13.
24. JP 3-13, *Information Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006), I-8; JP 2-01.3, V-11.
25. Edward C. Mann, Gary Endersby, and Thomas R. Searle, *Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2002), 31.
26. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 185. One of Major General James Mattis's main concerns was lack of information on the Iraqi commanders he would face. Intelligence provided little information on their backgrounds, personalities, and how they made decisions, which left the U.S. Marine Corps to "guess what we would do in their place . . . with predictable results."
27. Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, *On Point* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 86. While some maintain that Mohammed Said al-Sahaf was lying to the world media, the authors of *On Point* believe, based on interviews with captured Iraqi military leaders, that al-Sahaf did not know how successful the coalition had been.
28. JP 3-13, II-2.
29. George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2002), 268.
30. JP 5-0, GL-16, GL-18. A node is an element of a system that represents a person, place or thing. A link is an element of a system that represents a behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes.
31. Kevin M. Woods, Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, and Williamson Murray, *Iraqi Perspectives Project* (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2005), 130-48. These pages contain accounts of optimistic and incorrect reporting by Iraqi forces and leaders during the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
32. JP 5-0, IV-18.
33. JCS, *Joint Functional Concept for Force Application* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), 9.
34. "If the message you hammer home is 'There will be no mistakes,' or if you lose your temper and 'shoot the messenger' every time there's bad news, eventually your people will just stop telling you when things go wrong or suggesting how to make things go right. Then there will be some unpleasant surprises in store" (Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership* [Washington, DC: GPO, 1999], 5-25).
35. "Who Made Iraq's Strategic Decisions and Determined WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] Policy: Saddam's Place in the Regime," in "Regime Strategic Intent," *Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] on Iraq's WMD*, 30 September 2004, <www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap1.html#sect2>.
36. H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998), 90.
37. Joel S. A. Hayward, *Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East, 1942-1943* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 310.
38. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, 86.
39. Stephen T. Hosmer, *Operations Against Enemy Leaders* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2001). This document provides a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of attacks on leadership during war.
40. Michael Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1962), 208-33.
41. JP 3-13.4, *Military Deception* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006), I-4.
42. Ibid., IV-14.
43. Clausewitz, 119.
44. Ibid., 595-600.



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